Independence and the future Namibia will be independent with an African government. The colonial economy [Green and Kilj unen forthcoming; Barthold 1977; Murray, Morris, Dugard and Rubin 1974] , and the occupation regime [Kiijunen 1980 ] are in their death throes. Only the exact timing, the degree of destruction before independence and the modalities of transfer remain unclear. There is now a surge of medium-term strategy designing, goal setting, scenario writing about the political economy of an independent Namibia -by SWAPO and by the UN family [SWAPO 1976a, b] , by observers with no stated preferences [Barthold 1977 , USAID 1979 , by partisans both of radical change [Green 1980] and cautious gradualism [Thomas 1978] . This is inevitable and indeed desirable -at least so long as Namibians take a lead in the process and in scrutinising the products.2
However there is a danger in the often implicit assumption that Namibia can move directly and smoothly from her colonial past and chaotic I While Dr Green has served as a consultant to the United Nations Institute for Namibia (UNIN) and to SWAPO's economic secretariat, the views expressed are his personal responsibility and are not necessarily those of UNIN or S WA Po.
Z lt is useless to pretend that the USA can avoid having a policy toward and preferences about Namibia or that 'economic liberalism' will have no internal or external backers. Better that the premises and scenarios be set out, published, open to examination and criticism.
present into long-term political economic development. What happens in the first five or ten years depends very much on what happens in the first six, 12 or 18 months. Over this period, severe constraints, both physical and political will be felt.
Structural Inheritance3
The structural inheritance of Namibia is a contradictory one. Beyond meat, milk and tinned fish Namibia is now self sufficient in nothing. Even 50 per cent of staple grain is imported in good years.
Personal income distribution is virtually on race lines. In 1979 the average European household income was of the order of$ 141 5,000, and average African income $700. The urban poverty line data suggested $1,800 as the minimum necessary household income [Cronje, G. and S. 1979 This may help the railway and South African packing plants, but is hardly cost efficient or a base from which to shift markets. Imports are 90 per cent through and 70 per cent from the Republic; for maize and petroleum products as well as coal and mining machinery, locating alternative sources promptly is likely to be difficult. This is hardly alleviated by the fact that importing is a preserve of South African-based firms.
The patterns of services and of infrastructure are as distorted as personal income. There is no usable national language at present -the Boers' conduct has ruled out Afrikaans, English, 'the language of freedom', is not widely spoken, no Namibian language is broadly national. African education is deplorable in quantity (especially beyond primary) and quality, as are African health services. Productive services -eg agricultural planning and exten- 
Constraints on Policy
Nambia does have a relatively high achieved level of productive forces. It also has the potential for 74 increasing and altering the composition of its Gross Domestic Product. Because of present inequalities and the absence of an entrenched African elite, it has a remarkably high potential surplus for reconstruction and development investment, for productive services (eg education, health, pure water), for meeting urgent social requirements (eg the housing and urban infrastructure requirements of 'ending contract' and reuniting African families at workplaces). But it also inherits a very fragile set of structures, a great danger of things going wrong, a very hard and unforgiving set of constraints.
Namibia's ecology is fragile [Wellington 1955; FAO 1977] . Failure to rotate herds, overstocking, breakdown of boreholes can all quickly lead to rapid and potentially irreversible degradation of grass, to errosion and desertification. As the fishing industry has been devastated [Africa Contemporary Record 1977-78 and 1978-79; The Star 1978] , so could the ranching sector go -and without the same capacity for revival after a moderate 'rest period'.
The technology of the core of the economymining, ranching, urban water supply -has little tolerance for error. Misuse of machinery and failure either to enforce or educate workers to internalise safety codes would not merely (and disastrously) reduce GDP, exports and surplus. It could also kill people. Mozambique knows that to its cost from experience in coal. Ranching in Namibia is centrally planned in detail -land use, water supply, rotation of grazing [Nixon 1978] . There is little tolerance in the nature of the ecology for trial and error. Windhoek depends for much of its urban water on purified sewage run through one of the world's most technically sophisticated plants. A small error could mean a full-scale cholera epidemic throughout the urban area in which up to one fifth of the nation's people live.
The production mix is not -in the short runmalleable nor are its end uses. Gem diamonds,
The personnel structure is equally hard to alter. Skill requirements cannot be reduced radically. The ecology, technology and production mix set stark constraints -as do the new requirements of independence. Because of the history of Namibia many posts must be expatriate for a time. The projected requirement of 15,000 is daunting absolutely but, as a cut from 36,500 economically active Europeans today, it is a daunting challenge too [UNIN 1978] . Moreover, many of the present Europeans will not be welcome or indeed willing to stay for more than the briefest of periods.
Namibia's history is equally unforgiving. The political ecomomy of theft, of blood and iron, of fire and the sword means that radical changes must be made and be seen to be made rapidly. There is no longer any room for gradualism on land and mineral rights, nationalisation, on limiting (and being seen to limit) the power of TNCs, on ending the migrant labour system, on making rapid progress in raising African incomes, on placing Namibians in key posts.
Lastly the geographic location -or geopolitical setting -is hostile and unforgiving. South Africa is a neighbour with many kinds of residual leverage. Not least of these are its claims to Walvis Bay and the fact that the critical diamond industry will be within the range of South African guns on the other side of the Orange River estuary. Nor can one suppose that there will be much real understanding, let alone mutual respect between the two states.
A Checklist of Priorities
In the initial year of independence there will be a -Ranching is the heart of rural production.
Together with mining, it is critical to employment. It is likely to be hit by cattle exodus or killing -unless perhaps SWAPO publicly agrees to pay market value for cattle and created assets which are turned over in good order, and to prosecute for sabotage. 1f the industry is in reasonable working order, it will face marketing problems; more packing facilities (or possibly cattle boats to the Middle East) and new markets will be needed.
-It is only too evident that the fishing fleet will be in Table Bay , not Walvis Bay, on the day the latter becomes Namibian. To save jobs in the processing industry, contract fishing, training for skippers, boat building (abroad and at the Walvis bay base) are urgent necessities. So are conservation measures inshore and to a 200 mile limit to allow restoration of fish stocks (see above).
-Additions to basic services will be required. An acceptable national language (presumably English) must be taught. Adult education -especially rough and ready gap filling and upgrading courses -must have top priority so that the number of expatriates can be rapidly reduced from 36,500 to 15,000. The ground must be laid for radical expansion of the educational system. Health services -especially vaccination, health education, preventive medicine, first aid -must be made available nationally; these will build on the experience of Zambia and Angola, and semiliberated' area clinics and first aid teams.
-With the end of contract labour, 100,000 families will seek to be re-united at places of work. Most will wish to move rapidly. The urban layout and services as well as the construction (even on an artisanal plus communal basis) of say the first quarter of the homes needed during the first year is a minimum requirement to retain credibility and to avoid the instant creation of permanent urban slums to replace the prison compound and shack pattern.
-Personnel must be mobilised more vigorously and allocated more carefully than any other resource. Every Namibian with a special skill is a scarce asset. Namibians must hold and be seen to hold power. Not to do so would render land reform unacceptable no matter how technically desirable it might be as a first step. Use of expert technical support teams, each servicing a score of ranches with Namibian production level management, might be feasible. But expatriates in a wide range of positions will be needed and will have to be identified, recruited, supervised -and promptly fired if unsuitable.
-Income distribution will pose problems. African wages and salaries must be raised, but not to present European levels (which Namibia could not afford). Because separate scales by race must be ended -a different thing from separate scales for expatriates -a dilemma will exist in respect of would-be citizens of European ancestry. It will be necessary to raise agricultural incomes (by redistribution in ranching and by initial measures to raise productivity and prices for field crops) to avert a wholesale rural exodus and to aoid a huge urban/rural income gap.
-The public sector will need to be large, quick on its feet and business-like. It must be dominant in finance (beginning with a central bank) and external trade (beginning with marketing, ranching and fishing products and organising critical imports). It will also need to encompass ex-South African statal/parastatal production units and any other key enterprises whose exowners have been expelled or who have abandoned them (including probably at least one of the major post-1966 mines). All this will require the creation of Namibian controlled institutions, even if these have to be staffed initially by expatriate technical agents.
To What End?
This analysis of the short-term challenges of political independence is not a counsel for 'moderation', 'gradualism' or 'pragmatism'. Such a tactical approach would almost certainly fail to meet the challenges and destroy the political capital of any leadership which sought to follow it. Nor is it a plea for a return to a quasi-traditional way of life as a new starting point. Namibia never was Arcadia; any attempt to go back to 'before the Germans came' would be suicidal. But nor is it a counsel of despair. Namibia has degrees of freedom. It has a people united as well as deprived by its history, a leadership and cadres used to the long haul and the hard slog of the liberation struggle. The appropriate approach may be that of Antonio Gramsci: 'pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will'.
